This is getting to be a bit rambling, but never mind. A couple of other observations on 'Frederickan' vs 'Napoleonic', and the classic Prussian army.
One thing the napoleonicists make a big deal of, is the Grand Batteries and much higher concentrations of artillery in their period, compared to the SYW, and yet, when you look at the actual battles, the Prussians show a steady escalation in the proportion of artillery (although, it is true, their opponents generally dont). This reaches something of an apogee at Torgau, where Frederick is recorded as bringing 440 heavy pieces (that's in addition to the estimated 100-odd field and battalion pieces). This for an army of 45,000 - over 10 guns per 1000, a ratio not so much Napoleonic as positively Haigean*. It's true that he didnt muster them in a grand battery, but when you look at his extremely energetic battles, there is rarely any place where you would want a grand battery, so capability and need seem to fold neatly into eachother.
Interestingly, once the SYW was over, Frederick reduced the artillery establishment considerably, and seemed to regard it as unnecessary and ill-mannnered (ha): the rationale, I believe, was that the great decline of infantry quality during the war necessitated more artillery (gee that sounds familiar).
The other thing I notice is the great stress Duffy places on, and how he points out the importance of, the kleine krieg - the scouting of the Croats, hussars, bosniaks, freikorps, and other riffraff who weren't forced into the firing line :)
Again, the proportion of these grew - on both sides - as the war ground on: and in many of the battles, the success of the initial manouevres seems to depend enormously on the relative successs of the scouting screens (particularly noticeable at Kunersdorf, Torgau, and Liegnitz I think). Not exactly a surprise to anyone who's read Sun Tzu, and yet ... after the war, Frederick greatly diminishes the establishment of all his light troops: and, with all the European armies aping the Prussian fashion, that seems to lead to a great reduction of scouting troops in all the continental armies... including the British.
Nicely timed for the decade before the War In The Colonies put such a premium on them, really.
2 comments:
Perhaps Frederick's increase in artillery was directly related to his shortage of manpower late in the war. Substituting material for man is not uncommon (indeed it is the current American way of war, when possible).
Conversely, peacetime establishment might well focus on those troops less able to be raied quickly in war - ie line troops; with the expectation that irregulars/scouts could be raised quickly later.
I'd certainly agree, especially as Napoleons armies went through the same substitution of more artillery to bolster poorer infantry: I was just shocked at the numbers Frederick managed to get onto the field of battle.
As for irregulars & scouts being quickly raised & needing less training, well, Frederick found out the hard way, during the Silesian wars particularly, that the converse was true - in the early period (40-45) he was seriously hampered, repeatedly, by the poor quality of his scouts, esp hussars, and it's only with the appointment of Zieten as hussar general, and a peacetime period to hone his hussars, that the Prussian scouting screens had much chance of competing with the Austrians grenzers, croats and other riffraff :)
Ironically (or not), the French and British never really seemed to have developed competitive scouting forces on this level (either of numbers or of quality).
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