In James McPherson’s retelling, Abraham Lincoln’s strategic acumen lay in his recognition that the Confederate Army was the COG of the Southern war effort. His generals, on the other hand, were obsessed with maneuvering to gain control of the Southern capitol. Seen in this light, striking the COG had massive effect across the Southern system. This is what an real “effects-based operation” looks like. The Southern Army was neither either purely of strength or weakness, but it was what bound the Southern war effort together. There is nothing really complex about this–as Clausewitz tells us defeating the enemy’s fielded forces is a good idea. This is true either in a campaign of annihilation or erosion.The whole concept seems to me to have been taken a great deal too seriously, I must admit - when reading Clausewitz, I thought of this as nothing more than a metaphor, rather than a specific functional object.
If the purpose of war is to destroy the enemy will to resist*, then the 'Centre of Gravity' is whatever binds the enemy will together and gives unity - in the example above (as often in participatory governments) the field armies embody this, and should be the focal point of attacks, with subsidiary targets being whatever sustains them (e.g. March through Georgia destroying the logistical basis for the field armies).
But to enshrine the CoG in the way the US armed forces doctrine appears to have, is to set it in concrete and avoid any analysis of what is actually needed to destroy the enemy will, rather than to enable open thinking about it.
*and to exploit that lack of will until it recreates itself, see Iraq 2003-10!
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